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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores through two sets of interviews in 2001-2 and 2003-4 the changing 
attitudes and beliefs held by UK based financially literate individuals about key 
aspects of the adoption of IFRS in the EU in 2005 and the extent to which current 
problems with IFRS were foreseen.   
 
Interviewees continue to believe that the adoption of IFRS in the EU is a 
fundamentally good thing.  Concerns grew about: the complexity of the accounting 
model; consistency of interpretation; the future of the UK ‘true and fair view’; 
financial reporting for smaller entities; but particularly about US influence over the 
development of IFRS (following FASB’s convergence agreement with the IASB) 
linked with a perceived decline in UK influence.  The implementation of IFRS within 
the EU is seen as a ‘top down strategy’ which ignores the literature that accounting is 
‘context specific’ and which also ignores the UK Government’s own principles for 
better regulation.   
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Bewildered but better informed: A qualitative study of the changing 
attitudes of accountants and regulators to the introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the UK 
 
1.  Introduction 
In 2002 the European Union (EU) issued a Regulation (EU, 2002) requiring all EU 
listed companies to adopt IFRS (set by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB)) for their consolidated financial statements for financial years beginning on or 
after 1 January 2005.  The change is of particular significance in the UK because it 
has the largest capital market in the EU.   
 
During 2005 a number of concerns were raised.  These include: the complexity and 
appropriateness of the IFRS1 accounting model; the lack of accountability of the 
IASB itself; the 2002 ‘Norwalk’ agreement (FASB/IASB, 2002) reached between the 
IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to converge IFRS 
with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); the status of the UK’s 
true and fair view under IFRS (Morley Fund Management, 2005); and the future of 
financial reporting for non-listed entities.  A statement was made by EU 
Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, in October 2005 that a stable platform was needed 
to allow IFRS to settle down and no more IFRSs would be adopted in the EU in the 
immediate future (Grant, 2005a). 
 
In this study we take a qualitative, interview based research approach to changeover.  
We explore the attitudes and beliefs of a group of financially literate individuals i.e.  
preparers, auditors and regulators who were first interviewed in 2001/2 before the EU 
Regulation was passed and who were interviewed again in 2003/4.   
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The objective of this study is to explore the changing attitudes and beliefs held by the 
interviewees about key aspects of the IFRS project and to identify the extent to which 
the problems which emerged in 2005 were foreseen by the interviewees at the first or 
second interviews.   
 
The paper is divided into six sections.  The first section is the introduction.  In section 
two, we provide context and literature for the study.  Section three describes our 
methodology.  In section four we analyse the changing attitudes of our interviewees to 
the IFRS project.  In section five we discuss whether the interview evidence and the 
literature predict the 2005 criticisms.  Our conclusions are in section six and in section 
seven we consider opportunities for future research.   
 
2.  Context and literature review  
2.1 Context 
2.1.1 International Standard Setting  
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was set up in 1973 to set 
standards for global use.  Street (2005, p10) describes how, in 1992, led by the US 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), standard setters from around the 
world discussed co-operative efforts to improve standards with a long term goal of 
global harmonisation.  In 1995 the IASC agreed with The International Organization 
of Securities Regulators (IOSCO) to complete a set of core standards for global use by 
19992.  Momentum to introduce common standards worldwide increased following 
the Asian economic crisis, when the World Bank began to campaign for one set of 
global accounting standards (Accountancy, 1998).  In 2000 IOSCO recommended that 
its members permit the use of IFRS for transnational listings and issues of shares.  In 
the same year the European Commission (European Commission, 2000) proposed that 
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all companies with shares listed on an EU market should prepare their group accounts 
under IFRS for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2005.   
 
In 1999, the International Forum on Accountancy Development (IFAD) was created 
as ‘a working group between the Bank for International Settlements (the Basel 
Committee), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), IOSCO, the large 
Accounting Firms, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Bank and 
regional development banks (IFAD website, 2005).  IFAD’s stated mission was to 
improve market security and transparency, and financial stability on a global basis 
(IFAD website 2005).  Out of this forum, the large accounting firms developed their 
‘Vision’ for the accountancy profession (CPA Journal, 1999).  A key plank was the 
use of international accounting standards as the minimum benchmark for raising 
national standards.  The Vision sets out what it calls the ‘New Algebra’: 
“transparency + high quality reporting = encouragement to inward investment; 
lowered cost of capital; and helps conditions for market stability and economic 
growth” (IFAD, 2000).   
 
Given the potentially increasing importance if IFRS to world markets, under pressure 
from FASB, the IASC was restructured, a process which started in 1999 (Street, 2005) 
and renamed IASB in 2001.  The new board ratified all the existing standards, and 
determined that all future standards were to be designated International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).  This was followed by the EU Regulation in June 2002 
(EU, 2002) although at the time there was no approved suite of standards.  The stated 
intention of the Regulation (EU, 2002) is to help to eliminate barriers to cross-border 
trading in securities by improving comparability, which in turn will increase market 
efficiency and reduce the cost of raising capital for companies within the EU.   
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 There was also a longer term goal of reaching agreement with the SEC that overseas 
registrants in US markets would be permitted to file accounts prepared under IFRS 
without the currently required reconciliation to US GAAP.  After the 2001 Enron 
collapse and other scandals in the US undermined confidence in accounting, the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in July 2002 reforming much of the US framework.  
The IASB made an agreement in the same year with the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) formalising their commitment to convergence of US and 
International Accounting Standards (FASB/IASB, 2002).   
 
In September 2003, the European Commission (European Commission, 2003) 
endorsed all existing international accounting standards with the exception of 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 32 and 39 which related to the disclosure 
and measurement of financial instruments3.  These two standards were subsequently 
adopted after some EU-specific revisions.  In order to support consistent application 
of standards, the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) 
was set up.  Its brief is to review accounting issues that may give rise to divergent or 
unacceptable treatments and issue timely guidance in the form of Interpretations.   
 
Each member state within the EU can choose whether to permit or require unlisted 
companies and the individual accounts of publicly traded companies to report under 
IAS.  After a consultation in the UK (DTI, 2002) it was decided that all British 
companies would be permitted to use IFRS as an alternative to UK GAAP from 1 
January 2005, with a further review around 2008 to consider whether application of 
IFRS should become mandatory (DTI, 2003).  Since then, the UK Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) proposed that UK GAAP should converge with IFRS in step 
changes (ASB, 2004).   
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 2.1.2 Criticisms of IFRS emerging in 2005 
Jon Symonds, chairman of the Hundred Group4 (Jopson, 2005a) fundamentally 
supports global standards but expresses reservations over the conceptual framework, 
the use of fair values and the US influence over their form, claiming that the result is 
greater complexity and additional technical disclosure.  The complexity issue is 
supported by Blewitt (2005), Wild (2005) and Bruce (2005).  A key concern is that 
complexity may confound transparency which may in turn lead to mispricing of 
shares and misallocation of capital.  There are further concerns about a focus on 
abstruse technicalities rather than fundamental accounting issues (Jopson, 2005b) and 
about non-standard profit measures (Jopson 2005c).  It is recognised that some of the 
criticisms may relate only to transition arrangements (Bruce 2005).   
 
In the wake of criticisms of IFRS, the IASB’s structure and processes have come 
under scrutiny.  Preparers (e.g.  the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Larsen, 
2005)) and investors (e.g.  the Association of British Insurers and Investment 
Managers (Jopson, 2005d)) believe that they have insufficient influence over the 
standard setting process, although the IASB claim to be frustrated at the difficulty of 
involving these groups.  There is also a tension between the independence and 
accountability of the IASB.  Charlie McCreevy, EU internal market commissioner, 
has been amongst those questioning the political accountability of the IASB model, 
arguing that drafting standards is not a purely technical exercise (Buck, Parker and 
Mai, 2005).  The DTI have supported European efforts to reform the governance of 
the IASB (Jopson, 2005e) and some in the profession believe that the IASB needs 
greater representation from countries with experience of applying IFRS (Carey, 
2005).   
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The convergence project with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has 
prompted concerns that US requirements for rule based regulation as a defence 
against accusations of negligence may dominate the outcomes (Jopson, 2005f).  
Investors (Morley Fund Management, 2005) have already raised concerns over the 
difference between the ‘true and fair view’ under UK GAAP and ‘presents fairly in 
accordance with the relevant regulatory framework’ under IFRS and International 
Standards of Auditing (ISAs) which were adopted in the UK from 1 January 2005 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2004 p4.).  This has resulted in new clauses being included 
in the Company Law Reform Bill (DTI, 2005, para.  366) to clarify the interpretation.  
There are also concerns that SEC may exercise influence over interpretation of IFRS 
arising through its regular reviews of filings and comment letters (Jopson and Parker, 
2005).   
 
The future reporting model for companies outside the regulation remains a concern 
for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the ASB has been urged by 
representatives of the SME sector (Grant 2005b) to avoid continuing change.   
 
2.2 Literature Review  
Between the late 1970s through to the early 1990s, styles of regulation, de-regulation 
and self-regulation of accounting came under scrutiny in the UK and elsewhere (see 
Mitnick, 1980, and Baldwin and Cave, 1999 for overviews of these developments).  
The focus has now shifted towards cost effective independent regulation in preference 
to self regulation.  The UK government’s Better Regulation Task Force (2003) sets 
out five principles of good regulation: proportionality; accountability; consistency; 
transparency and targeting5.   
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A classic case for regulation rests on the potential economic benefits to be derived for 
all parties and the achievement of a Pareto optimum6.  In the case of financial 
reporting, consistent and dependable accounting disclosure is a prerequisite to 
effective communication (Solomons, 1991).  Effective communication underpins 
many uses for published accounts, such as defining and applying contracts 
(Whittington, 1993), reducing search costs (Meeks and Meeks, 2002), countering 
information asymmetry between owners and managers, and between buyers and seller 
of shares.  Information asymmetry may inhibit smooth running of capital markets, so 
the provision of reliable standard information to capital providers could be expected 
to reduce the cost of capital (Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999) and serve stakeholder 
interests (Day, 2001).   
 
Stittle (2004) claims adoption of IFRS by the EU will facilitate cross border trading 
but recognises that the changeover will be difficult.  He anticipates that there will be 
fewer problems in the UK because of the similarities between UK GAAP and IFRS.  
Other claimed benefits include lower cost of capital, better management decision-
making, avoidance of misinterpretation and investment time lags, the saving of time 
and money and the general raising of reporting standards (Choi, Frost and Meeks 
(1999); Turner (1983); PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000)).   
 
There are alternative views.  Myddelton (2004, p92) argues that the imposition of 
narrowly defined accounting treatments are unnecessary, since a free market will 
arbitrate between approaches, and better techniques will be developed.  He claims that 
international standards are the work of a small and unrepresentative elite.  Sunder 
(2002) challenges the monopolistic nature of accounting standard setters and believes 
that competition between standard setters will improve the quality and efficiency of 
standards and of financial reporting.  Without competition, it is not possible to assess 
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whether different reporting standards would lead to lower costs of capital.  Allowing 
US GAAP and IFRS to compete would restrict political interference and cut back the 
cook-book approach of US GAAP.   
 
Context sensitivity of accounting regulatory regimes is seen by some researchers as an 
inhibiting influence to global harmonisation.  Accounting evolves within and in 
response to the social and political cultures in which it operates (Choi et al 1999; 
Nobes and Parker, 2001).  Gray and Vint (1995) and Bloom and Naciri, (1989) 
suggest that a single regulatory system imposed externally is unlikely to succeed in 
every country.   
 
Trombetta (2001) used an analytical model to show that a ‘strong harmonisation 
regime’, i.e.  one in which a single GAAP is imposed in each country, is never the 
optimal regime in terms of information transmission from managers to investors.  
Schredelseker (2001) used a simulation approach to examine the value of public 
accounting data in the absence of market efficiency, and concludes that ‘it is not 
always the case that the better a market is endowed with public information, the 
higher the welfare of investors and other users will be.’ Where countries have smaller 
capital markets, as do a number of EU member states, controlling owners are likely to 
have their own sources of information.  Thus the quality of published information 
could be less important (Myddelton, 2004).   
 
Bush (2005) points out fundamental differences between the UK and US regimes, and 
believes that introducing aspects of the US regime into other countries, including the 
UK, is conceptually unsound.  In the US federal law is fundamentally focused on 
securities regulation, rather than the UK stewardship and governance model, and 
company law operates in different models at state level.  Page (2005) questions the 
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feasibility of achieving a global conceptual framework for accounting.  He compares 
the search for a common framework to Lewis Carroll’s ‘Hunting of the Snark’ where 
the object of the search might turn out to be less desirable than anticipated and lead to 
the loss of national standard setters.   
 
Schipper (2005) raises concerns about interpretation of IFRS, believing that the 
demand for interpretation within the EU will be high and that IFRIC may not cope 
with all the requests.  This could lead to a range of different interpretations and 
undermine the objective of common standards of reporting.  She anticipates the 
possibility of an SEC style European securities regulator to ensure consistency, but 
recognises that there may be problems with reaching agreement on this within the EU.  
She also notes the adoption of fair value measurements will present real challenges as 
it requires a different sort of expertise from that in traditional accounting.   
 
In sum, the development of strategies for global harmonisation of accounting 
standards may be seen as a top down strategy, promoted by securities regulators, a 
small number of standard setters mainly from Anglo-Saxon countries, other large 
global players, such as the World Bank and the Basel Committee, and seven large 
accounting firms (Street, 2005, IFAD, 2000).  The European Commission appears to 
have been a late entrant to the project.  Not surprisingly the strategy has been 
promoted by citing the benefits of harmonisation, such as the facilitation of cross 
border transactions and lower cost of capital, but ignoring the criticisms in the 
academic literature cited above, relating to context, culture and the dangers of 
monopoly and lack of competition.   
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3.  Research methodology 
Our empirical data comprises a longitudinal set of interviews with regulators, 
company directors and audit firm partners based in the UK.  Longitudinal data allows 
the measurement of social change (Ruspini, 2000) and enables the researcher to 
follow particular events over time (Dale and Davies, 1994) 
 
The first round of interviews was carried out between December 2001 and March 
2002, before the Regulation (EU, 2002) introducing IFRS into the EU had been 
approved and before the full impact of Enron had become clear.  The interviews were 
then repeated approximately two years later (between November 2003 and January 
2004) when the implications of the 2005 deadline were becoming clearer.  The 
prospective method was used so that separate measurements were used on each 
occasion to minimize memory recall problems.  (Ruspini, 2000)  
 
The interviewees were drawn from practitioners and regulators who had some 
knowledge about IFRS at the time of the first interviews.  Two of the interviewees are 
company directors with accounting qualifications, one from a top 100 (FTSE 100) UK 
listed company (designated C1), and the other (C2) from a top 350 (FTSE 350) 
company with overseas subsidiaries which prepared accounts under IFRS.  This 
company delisted shortly after the first interview.  Four are audit firm partners being: 
one technical partner from a Big Four7 firm (designated P1); one Big Four audit 
partner (P2); one mid-tier firm audit partner (P3); and one small firm partner (P4).  
The two smaller practitioners were interviewed because at the time of the first 
interviews, no decision had been made as to whether all UK companies would be 
required to adopt IFRS.  By the time of the second interview, the DTI had announced 
that smaller entities could use either IFRS or UK GAAP.  However, the ASB 
announced plans to converge UK GAAP with IFRS thus keeping smaller firm and 
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companies indirectly within the IFRS loop.  Four regulators (designated R1 – R4) 
were interviewed on both occasions, but we experienced sample attrition (Robson, 
2002) as one regulator interviewed at the first round had left.  We interviewed a 
replacement and a second regulator at the same body to cover this.  In all 23 
interviews were carried out.  Users were not interviewed because preliminary 
enquiries of users indicated that they had very little awareness of IFRS at the time of 
either set of interviews.   
 
All interviews carried out as part of the first round are given the additional 
designation (a), while those included in the second round are designated (b)8.  One of 
the company directors (C2) and two of the audit partners (P3 and P4) are not involved 
with companies affected by the EU Regulation.  All interviewees were given 
assurances that neither they nor their organisation would be identified in any 
published output. 
 
Each interview was conducted separately at the interviewee’s workplace.  Two 
interviewers were used, and both interviewers attended the initial interviews to ensure 
the development of a uniform approach.  A semi-structured format was used and a 
series of open-ended questions was drafted from the broad questions which were 
asked at both interviews.  This gave us a framework in which to see what changes in 
attitudes had occurred since the first round of interviews whilst giving us sufficiently 
flexibility so that questions could be adapted to take account of changing events. 
 
The following questions were framed from preliminary meetings and from reviewing 
the literature: 
a) Is the introduction of common accounting standards within the EU for the group 
accounts of listed companies desirable? 
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b) How familiar are you with IFRS? What is your view of the quality of the 
standards? 
c) The introduction of IFRS will mean a loss of influence by UK regulators, 
preparers, auditors and users over the rules that govern financial reporting.  Is this 
a worthwhile cost?  
d) What is the future form of financial reporting for those entities in the UK not 
covered by the Regulation? Future of UK GAAP and ASB? 
e) To what extent is it likely that there will be consistent application of IFRS across 
the EU from 2005? 
These questions were put to all the interviewees, although their expertise, experience 
and interest in various questions varied considerably.  Where appropriate, neutral 
prompts were used to encourage further explanation.  Where other relevant issues 
emerged during the interview, these were explored (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  All the 
interviews were recorded in full and subsequently transcribed (Jones, 1985).  Content 
analysis was conducted with the assistance of the QSR-NVivo software, which 
facilitates analysis of interview material for the purposes of qualitative research.  A 
coding scheme was developed from the data based on identified themes, which 
emerged from repeated reading of the material.  Coding was checked for consistency 
by two researchers and input into the software, from which the analysis was carried 
out.   
 
4.  Interview evidence 
A summary of the interviewee responses to each question at each interview is 
provided in tables 1 to 5. 
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4.1 Common accounting standards for listed companies within Europe 
Table 1 about here 
As table 1 illustrates, the initial response of all our interviewees was unanimously 
supportive of the notion of harmonisation of accounting standards (apart from one 
regulator who felt it inappropriate to comment).  The most frequently cited 
justification centred round the needs of investors and the capital markets.  Greater 
transparency will allow investors better to understand the companies in which they 
might invest, consequently capital will be allocated and priced more efficiently.  This 
improved general level of understanding will result in a reduction of the risk premium 
demanded by investors, so reducing the cost of capital available to companies.  While 
this was considered important in the context of promoting a single European capital 
market, some respondents suggested that the global dimension was more important 
than the European one. 
 
A related theme was that IFRS would represent a dramatic improvement to existing 
accounting practice in many parts of Europe: 
‘It’s also a good thing for those countries in Europe who don’t have today 
good accounting standards as regards information for the markets…I would 
argue that there are thirteen countries out of the fifteen today who need 
improvements in their accounting standards.’ (R1a) 
 
The argument that common standards would reduce the cost of preparing consolidated 
accounts for international groups was less prominent.  As R5a noted, the close link 
between tax and accounting in many EU countries could delay acceptance of IFRS for 
single company accounts.   
 
Having established their broad support for harmonisation, some respondents then 
went on to express some reservations concerning specific developments.  An issue of 
concern was that IFRS would be interpreted so differently in various European 
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countries that the whole project would be undermined (C2a).  A further concern was 
expressed that Euro-IFRS might develop (either through the endorsement process or 
subsequent interpretations), which could be at variance with the version produced by 
the IASB (P1a and R1a).   
 
There was no radical change in views between the two sets of interviews and again 
the interviewees were supportive of common accounting standards in Europe for 
essentially the same reasons.  However it was noticeable that more interviewees were 
prepared to express reservations at the second interview, often with greater force.  
Again there were concerns (R1b and R4b) that the new standards should be global 
rather than a European adaptation.   
 
The two company directors were particularly robust in criticising aspects of the 
project.  C1b criticised the way in which IFRS was developing, and doubted that the 
standards would deliver the theoretical benefits of a lower cost of capital.  C2b was 
again doubtful that common interpretation of IFRS would be achieved, suggesting the 
problem might be due to a lack of will rather than transitional difficulties: 
‘Various governments in Europe have got an entirely different agenda.  And 
they prescribe precisely how certain transactions have to be recorded which 
are not in compliance with international accounting practices and it is 
extremely unlikely for political reasons that they’re going to change that view.  
And they will be concealed as they are at present in various countries.’ (C2b) 
 
4.2 Knowledge and evaluation of IFRS 
Table 2 about here. 
As the panel of interviewees was selected on the basis that they were likely to be 
knowledgeable on the subject of IFRS, it was not surprising that the majority 
considered themselves reasonable familiar with the standards (see table 2).  At the 
first interview all the regulators were able to talk with reasonable confidence about 
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IFRS, although the precise level of familiarity depended on their role and degree of 
exposure to IFRS.  At the second interview an additional regulator (R7b) had been 
added who claimed a lower level of familiarity with IFRS.  Change over time was 
most evident with the partner respondents.  At the first interview only the technical 
partner (P1a) could discuss the issues with real confidence, but by the second all the 
partners felt able to engage in the debate at some level.  Both company directors were 
able to offer opinions on IFRS, although, somewhat perversely, one of them (C2b) 
claimed to be less knowledgeable at the time of the second interview.   
 
At the first interviews most respondents who felt able to express a view were 
generally positive about the quality of IFRS, believing them to have improved 
considerably over recent years (and likely to improve further in the future).  Nobody 
suggested that IFRS was superior to UK GAAP and two interviewees (P1a and R1a) 
believed the quality of accounting standards in the UK would decline in 2005.  At the 
second interview two interviewees (P4b and R3b) had moved from a broadly neutral 
stance to broadly negative, while R1b remained sceptical.  By contrast, P2b 
considered IFRS ‘more intellectually coherent’ than UK GAAP. 
 
One regulator who already had experience of working with IFRS at the time of the 
first interviews warned that the differences with UK GAAP were greater than many 
people believed: 
‘What’s interesting is you can read the standards with a UK perspective and 
misunderstand them…if you go in cold, reading the standards without having 
thought about the framework, then you can misconstrue things.’ (R3a) 
 
Some interviewees felt that the IASB tended to be too theoretical in its approach 
producing solutions which are ‘sometimes just too difficult for companies to apply in 
practice.’ (R4a) 
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 This was a view that appeared to gain more support (e.g.  from C1b, P1b and R3b) at 
the second interviews.  More specifically a company director (C1b) attacked the use 
of fair values in the new standards: 
‘What we’re ending up with is a sort of fair value balance sheet, well actually 
not a fair value balance sheet at all.  Because you’ve got all sorts of things 
missing.  I mean, how do you fair value the knowledge and know-how of the 
people? How do you fair value the intellectual property? How do you fair 
value market positions, distribution, you can’t fair value any of that stuff … a 
constructive accounting model based on half of the things stated at fair value 
and totally ignoring all the other things is a complete nonsense.’ (C1b) 
 
Both company directors expressed the view that the standard setting process was 
dominated by large firm technical partners and preparers did not have much influence.   
 
With respect to the position of users under the new IFRS regime, the dominant view 
was that analysts (and certainly other users) did not understand accounts now and 
were unlikely to understand them under IFRS.  One regulator believed users were: 
‘Probably bewildered by it before, but I suppose it depends on what view you 
take of it…On whether it does have an effect in the short term of making 
profits more variable than they might be…a bit more bewildered than they 
were before, but arguably they’re better informed.’ (R7b) 
 
The potential impact of US convergence on IFRS was raised by just one respondent 
(P1a) during the first interviews.  Given the increasing emphasis on US convergence 
at the time of the second round of interviews, it is not surprising that more 
interviewees (notably R1, R3 and R6) had become concerned that IFRS might evolve 
into a much more rule based regime resulting in standards which are too detailed and 
offer too many alternative treatments.  In particular there was uncertainty about the 
continued existence of the true and fair over-ride under IFRS: 
‘Now if you get to the point where Finance Directors are saying, ‘Well, of 
course, I’m showing it you this way because I’m simply not allowed to show it 
this way in the financial accounts, because I believe this is the right way to 
look at it, but, you know, I’m not allowed…’ I think then you start to get a 
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degrading of the usefulness of financial information or the reliability of 
financial information within a capital market.’ (P2a) 
 
The likely loss of the UK notion of ‘substance over form’ were a cause for regret for 
many respondents who noted that FRS 5 had been an effective counter against ‘all 
sorts of financial engineering and quasi subsidiaries and things like that’ (R1a).  
However, several respondents acknowledged that such concepts would be difficult to 
export to countries with a more rule-based tradition, which was felt to include both 
the US and most of Europe: 
‘But it’s not a philosophy if you like that is easily exported.  … The Americans 
are very keen on certainty.  So they’re very keen on bright lines, and they’re 
saying to people, well what does it feel like, rather than what is it? Isn’t easy 
to explain in the US context.  Equally, there are large parts of Europe which 
are used to the law setting accounting, Napoleonic code-type areas where the 
law is very black and white and so we’re really in quite a minority in the 
world, the UK, as regards thinking about economic substance of transactions.’ 
(R1b) 
 
IAS 39 was singled out by several respondents as unsatisfactory at both rounds of 
interviews (‘appalling’ (R1a); ‘a c**p standard’ (P1a)), and accounting for business 
combinations (R1b) also attracted adverse comments.  There were generally far more 
adverse comments on IFRS during the second round of interviews, perhaps because 
interviewees understood IFRS better, perhaps because the final standards for 2005 
were easier to predict.   
 
 
4.3 Loss of UK influence 
Table 3 about here. 
At the first interviews (see table 3) all the respondents believed that a loss of influence 
over standard-setting by UK preparers, auditors and users was inevitable, but most of 
these also believed that it was a necessary development in the harmonisation project 
and that the benefits outweighed the costs.  There were indications of widespread 
 18
indifference to the loss of sovereignty from the company directors and most of the 
partners. 
 
The discussion around issues of influence took place mainly in the context of UK 
compared with the rest of Europe, rather than globally.  Some of the regulators, while 
acknowledging some loss of influence, also suggested that the UK probably remains 
the strongest voice in Europe.  Firstly, because the UK has the largest capital market, 
it has a need for good quality accounting, and has a better understanding of what is 
required by capital markets.  Secondly, the UK already has the most highly-developed 
accounting standards in Europe, and the most experienced standard-setters, and this 
should result in a high level of influence.  This view was under-pinned by statements 
from the IASB that it would seek to develop IFRS in partnership with key national 
standard setters. 
 
At the second interviews, the company directors and partners (except the technical 
partner P1b) re-affirmed their lack of interest in trying to influence accounting 
standards: 
‘Well I tell you again - this is a large end company comment - the vast 
majority of them would say, ‘don’t care.  Really don’t care you know, what we 
want is we just want one set of rules…’’ (P2b) 
 
One partner (P4b) made the point that smaller firms and companies never had any 
influence over the UK standard setting process, so for them little would change in 
changing to IFRS.   
 
Other interviewees (notably the regulators) continued to suggest that UK influence 
would be worth sacrificing if it resulted in a stronger global role for Europe.  
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However, a number of interviewees (P1b, R1b, R3b and R6b) feared in practice, the 
UK’s was less than it should be:  
‘When the IASB was formed and particularly when Europe took it’s decision I 
could see the impact of that on the ASB and somewhere in my mind behind a 
whole load of mist, I had some sort of image of the ASB continuing to be an 
important factor in this whole thing …I think the quality of thinking that came 
out of the ASB was every bit as good, possibly even better than came out of 
FASB.  I saw David [Tweedie] being able to use the ASB as a counterbalance 
for FASB and I think that was an important part of the structure…As the 
processes continue I don’t think we’re managing to achieve that and whether 
we missed a trick somewhere along the line or whether I was totally fooling 
myself by thinking there was a road that ran through the mist to some 
desirable place, I don’t know.  But I have difficulty seeing how the ASB is a 
major force.  I think it’s got a transitional role but I have difficulty seeing how 
it’s a major force.’ (P1b) 
 
By way of possible explanation, one regulator (R4b) spoke of the resentment he had 
observed among other European nations of the prevalence of ‘Anglo voices’ and the 
critics appeared not to discriminate between UK and US influences. 
 
4.4 Future financial reporting for entities not covered by the Regulation 
Table 4 about here. 
At the time of the first round of interviews, no announcement had been made by the 
DTI regarding the future of financial reporting for entities not directly affected by the 
Regulation. 
 
The least controversial aspect of the problem was subsidiaries belonging to a listed 
group.  C1a made it clear that there would be real advantages to the efficiency and 
accuracy of the consolidation process if IFRS could be applied by all the subsidiaries 
within a group. 
 
There was much more caution expressed regarding the suitability of IFRS for unlisted 
companies.  Even enthusiasts of the project for listed companies (such as R1a) were 
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dubious that the principle of harmonisation was relevant for such companies, 
particularly at the smaller end.  C2a, director of an unlisted group, believed that the 
intricacies of IFRS would be lost on the principal users of their accounts. 
 
The regulators had a less practical perspective on the problem and could see the 
desirability of moving all companies on to a single set of standards within a 
reasonable period of time.  One justification was that barriers should not be created 
between non-listed and listed companies (R1a, P3a).  A more general concern (P2a, 
P3a, R1a, R3a) was that UK financial reporting should have an internal consistency 
(although given the aim of the ASB to converge its standards with IFRS, this would 
not necessarily require the direct adoption of IFRS).  One regulator (R1a) could see 
the sense in maintaining a separate UK GAAP, to allow the possibility that it might 
diverge from IFRS ‘if somebody does something really stupid internationally which 
we don’t want to inflict on our non-listed companies’. 
 
There was recognition from interviewees that the needs of medium sized companies 
were different from small ones.  There was some enthusiasm from regulators (R1a, 
R3a, R5a) for the idea that the IASB should develop a FRSSE based on international 
standards for small companies.  The consensus was that this would use the same 
measurement criteria as full IFRS but with reduced disclosure requirements.  
Somewhat perversely the interviewees with the greatest experience of applying the 
FRSSE based on UK GAAP (i.e.  P3a, P4a) were fairly lukewarm about its benefits. 
 
When the second interviews took place, the DTI, following consultation, had 
announced that companies not covered by the Regulation would be given the option 
of staying on UK GAAP or transferring over to IFRS.  Even then some interviewees 
noted that some detailed issues had yet to be clarified (e.g.  was it possible to adopt 
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IFRS and then revert to UK GAAP?).  One interviewee (R3b) suggested that tax 
considerations might drive the choice.   
 
There was still agreement that there was a clear difference in the needs of medium 
companies as opposed to small ones.  If anything views against the continuation of a 
separate UK GAAP had hardened: 
‘We don’t want three sets of standards.  We don’t want listed IAS, big GAAP 
for UK but not listed and little GAAP.  We want a set of standards for 
companies which are complex entities and little GAAP.  And I think that is 
where we’ve got to go… By 2010 I would expect UK standards to have 
essentially become IAS standards, apart from small GAAP’ (P1b) 
 
P2b noted that the examinations of the professional accountancy bodies had largely 
moved over to IFRS, and suggested this would hasten the demise of UK GAAP. 
 
Little progress had been made on developing an international FRSSE by the time of 
the second interviews, but it remained the preferred small company solution, with 
some (e.g.  R6b) suggesting that its use might be extended to medium enterprises. 
 
One regulator expressed a new doubt that the needs of the smallest companies would 
be met by an IFRS based FRSSE: 
‘The UK perception is that you have a FRSSE and the FRSSE says you retain 
the measurement principles and you reduce the disclosures.  But the 
measurement principles, as I said earlier, are getting more and more 
technically pure but perhaps slightly impractical.  So there must be questions 
about how sensible it is to require two sweet shops merging to identify 
goodwill and all the other things they are obliged to do.’ (R3b) 
 
The audit firm partners interviewed were asked what advice they would give to their 
clients regarding the possible transition to IFRS.  Given that the DTI had yet to 
pronounce on the subject, they were understandably cautious at the first interviews.  
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At the second interviews, partners in the smaller practices (P3 and P4) remained 
doubtful that the best interests of their clients would be served by moving to IFRS:  
‘I think anybody who is advising them to do anything more than sit tight is 
probably trying to find a way of earning more fees without providing more 
value.’ (P4b) 
 
The partners (e.g.  P2b) in the large firms denied that they would actively promote 
moving to IFRS among their clients. 
 
An issue related to the nature of financial reporting for non-listed companies is the 
future of the ASB, particularly if some form of IFRS were extended to all companies, 
thereby eliminating the ASB’s core role of setting standards.  At the first round of 
interviews there was some support for the ASB having a continuing role, particularly 
among the regulators (e.g.  R1a), who believed it to be influential on the global stage.  
However, one partner (P1a) noted that the effectiveness of the ASB was in large part 
due to the involvement of representatives from industry, who might be more reluctant 
to be involved when major decisions are taken elsewhere.   
 
Given that at the second interviews fewer believed that a separate UK GAAP could 
be justified in the medium term, some suggested that the ASB’s future role rested in 
matters other than standard setting (e.g.  corporate governance).  Others were less 
convinced it had a future (e.g.  R3b suggested that the ‘think tank’ role should be 
taken on by the professional bodies). 
 
4.5 Interpretation of international accounting standards 
Table 5 about here 
None of the interviewees at either interview believed that IFRS would be interpreted 
in a common and consistent way throughout Europe immediately after their 
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introduction in 2005 (see table 5).  There was something of a division between those 
who thought that the differences were temporary in nature while a common approach 
became established and those who were rather more cynical about the motives of 
participants. 
 
At the first interviews, both company directors questioned whether the will to achieve 
common interpretation existed in some European countries.  The optimists believed 
that the adverse effects would be reduced as a result of a number of factors.  One of 
the partners (P1a) suggested the large audit firms, through their global networks, 
would have a major impact in establishing common interpretation.  Another (P2a) 
made the point that companies which formed part of multinational group would 
achieve consistency via group prescribed policies and culture.  Although the existence 
of IFRIC was not widely known, one regulator (R4a) considered their role to be 
fundamental in preventing widespread differences in interpretation.  Even some with a 
positive medium term view (e.g.  P3a and R1a) were concerned that in the short term 
some preparers might exploit the uncertainty created by the transition.  Two 
regulators (R4a and R5a) expressed concerns that the temptation to develop Euro-
interpretations (i.e.  different from standard IFRS) might prove too strong.   
 
By the time of the second interview, presumably having given the issue greater 
consideration, interviewees were able to articulate with greater clarity how 
interpretation differences might arise: 
‘You can take a standard such as the leasing standard and find that the words 
in the international standard are very similar in certain areas to the words in 
the UK standard.  So there is a natural assumption that the result under the 
international standard will be the same as under the UK standard until you 
start talking to people from other countries...So you will get a period of time 
companies all round the world saying they’re following IFRS and then one 
year, two years, three years, four years down the line altering things, where 
the standard hasn’t changed because they say “Oh! We now realise how the 
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rest of you do it.” And I think it’s inherent in the process because you’re 
trying to bring together all these cultures and backgrounds and things.’ (P1b) 
 
With respect to the specific transition from UK GAAP to IFRS, two interviewees 
(C1b and R1b) implicitly expressed greater optimism on the second interview.  One 
theme that emerged much more strongly in the second interviews (from P4b, R2b and 
R3b) was the potential huge workload faced by IFRIC from 2005, particularly with 
requests for further guidance from EU countries used to a rules based system rather 
than one based on principles.  For the same reason, there were continuing concerns 
(R2b and R6b) that European interpretations might be developed by a securities 
regulators or similar institution.  A number of interviewees (P2b, R1b and R6b) re-
iterated the point that the global audit firms had a large responsibility in minimising 
interpretation differences without their interpretations becoming ‘institutionalised’.  
One regulator (R1b) suggested that the SEC might become a significant interpreter of 
IFRS, simply because it regulates the world’s largest capital market.   
 
5.  Discussion 
 
5.1 The harmonisation vision 
The objective of global harmonisation has been promoted by such powerful forces as 
the largest accountancy firms, securities regulators, leading standard setters and the 
World Bank (Street, 2005).  These institutions believe common accounting standards 
are fundamental to the continued development of global securities markets.  Our 
interviewees accepted the arguments for harmonisation and were unchanging in the 
belief that it was desirable for Europe to move towards common standards.  Press 
comments do not suggest in principle that European convergence is a bad idea.   
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5.2 Convergence of IFRS with US GAAP 
The impact of the convergence agreement between the IASB and FASB (FASB & 
IASB, 2002) has prompted much comment as it was not signalled as part of the 
European agenda.  Our interviewees, particularly at the second round of interviews, 
picked up the issue quite strongly, especially as the convergence project was 
perceived to have delayed the completion of the standards for Europe.  There was 
little confidence that the US convergence project would deliver anything other than a 
version of IFRS heavily influenced by US GAAP.  There were concerns that IFRS 
might evolve into a rule-based regime, because that form of regulation best meets the 
needs of the litigious US environment.  The same issue has subsequently been 
critically analysed in the press (Jopson, 2005f).  If the convergence project is a 
success, most of the largest companies in the world would be subject to a single set of 
accounting standards, although Sunder (2002) and Myddleton (2004) warn against 
creating monopolistic standard setters, arguing that competition ensures quality and 
efficiency in accounting standards.   
 
5.3 Loss of UK influence 
When our interviewees were questioned about the UK’s loss of influence over 
standard setting, the ‘outsiders’ (i.e.  company directors and small firm partners), who 
never believed that they had any influence, were indifferent at both sets of interviews.  
However, it was noticeable that the views of many of the ‘insiders’ (regulators and 
large firm partners) did change.  At the first interviews there was little concern about 
loss of influence as this was seen as a worthwhile price for European convergence.  
By the time of the second interviews a number of insiders expressed surprise at the 
relative lack of influence the UK was able to exercise on the process, related to 
concerns that the US is having too much influence over IFRS.  In the press this has 
developed into a debate about the governance and accountability of the IASB (e.g.  
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Buck et al, 2005; Carey, 2005: Jopson, 2005c;).  Myddleton (2004) suggests that 
international standard setters are an unrepresentative elite.   
 
5.4 Complexity of IFRS accounting model 
Some of our interviewees expressed reservations about the complex and technical 
nature of IFRS, (particularly the move towards fair values) especially at the second 
round of interviews.  There were concerns that the theoretical approach adopted by 
the IASB would impose excessive burdens on preparers.  Such criticisms have been 
echoed in the literature (Schipper, 2005) and in the press from all sections of the 
accounting community (Jopson, 2005a; Jopson, 2005b; Blewitt, 2005).  Some current 
critics have logically extended the above argument to suggest that there were dangers 
that it would not produce the anticipated benefits because users would not understand 
the information generated (Wild, 2005; Bruce, 2005).  The interviewees frequently 
expressed doubts that users would understand financial statements produced under 
IFRS.  However, they tended not to link this observation back to the arguments for 
harmonisation.  Given the increased cost of compliance and the possibility that the 
promised benefits may not materialise, we question whether the EU IFRS project 
would satisfy the UK Government’s principles for regulation (Better Regulation Task 
Force, 2003) in respect of proportionality and transparency.   
 
Some interviewees linked the theoretical nature of the standards, with a standard 
setting process dominated by technical experts to the exclusion of preparers and users.  
This theme has been discussed in the press recently (Larsen, 2005; Jopson, 2005d) 
However, regulation over financial reporting is always going to assume greater 
importance to ‘insiders’ who will be prepared to devote more resources to it.   
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5.5 Issues specific to the UK framework 
There is considerable support in the literature for the view that accounting regulation 
evolves in response to its context and that imposing an external regulatory system 
may be unsuccessful (Nobes and Parker, 2001; Choi et al, 1999; Gray and Vint, 1995; 
Bloom and Naciri, 1989).  Complications arise if one aspect of regulation is 
harmonised, but others are excluded.  For example the status of the UK true and fair 
view under IFRS was a concern to some interviewees and was raised again by 
institutional investors (Morley Fund Management, 2005) leading to a debate in the 
press and eventually resulting in a change to the Company Law Reform Bill (DTI, 
2005, para 366).  Concerns about context were more closely linked to US 
convergence at the second interviews, but also existed at the first interviews among 
interviewees who realised most European countries have a rule based tradition.   
 
Another example is the future of financial reporting for UK companies not covered by 
the Regulation (EU, 2002).  Among our interviewees there was little belief that the 
full set of IFRS standards was appropriate for the majority of unlisted companies and 
their users.  Equally a parallel system comprising IFRS and UK GAAP was generally 
considered undesirable on the grounds of cost and consistency.  These issues emerged 
particularly at the second interviews.  A number of interviewees considered that the 
solution might be reporting standards for smaller entities based on IFRS with the 
same measurement principles but reduced disclosure requirements (although one 
regulator noted that even the measurement principles in IFRS were often complex and 
difficult to apply).  Some interviewees questioned whether medium sized companies 
should also benefit from reduced reporting requirements, although it was also 
recognised that their needs were not necessarily the same as small ones.  Recent press 
reports refer to calls for convergence of UK GAAP with IFRS to be delayed (Grant, 
2005b) to ensure that SMES do not have to endure that change followed by another 
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when the IASB produces a second set of standards for SMEs.  It is evident that when 
the decision to adopt IFRS for listed companies was made, no plan was in place for 
the future of financial reporting for the majority of UK companies which are not 
listed, but are required to file GAAP compliant.  In respect of SMEs the IFRS project 
does not meet the Better Regulation Task Force’s (2003) principles of proportionality 
and targeting.   
 
5.6 Interpretation 
Our interviewees expressed little confidence at either interview that application of 
IFRS would be consistent across the EU in 2005.  The main fear expressed (from 
regulators and the technical partner) was that a European version of IFRS might 
develop so undermining any attempts at global convergence.  Although there is 
literature (e.g.  Trombetta, 2001) that questions whether harmonisation will produce 
the expected benefits, our interviewees are either unaware or unconvinced by it. 
 
IFRIC was not known except by regulators and large firm partners, but at the second 
interviews our interviewees had begun to appreciate the potential importance of its 
role.  They also expressed doubts about its ability to deal with all the issues of 
interpretation which might be referred to it, particularly from countries used to 
detailed accounting rules.  This point is also raised in the literature (Schipper, 2005).  
If IFRIC is unable to cope, then interviewees feared that other regulators might 
engage in interpreting IFRS from their own perspective.  One of the interviewees 
voiced the more specific concern that the SEC could become a major interpreter of 
IFRS because of the size and importance of the capital markets under its jurisdiction 
and because a number of the largest EU based companies had a dual listing in the US.  
This has been picked up in the press as another potential aspect of US domination 
(Jopson and Parker, 2005).   
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 6.  Conclusion 
In this paper we explore longitudinally the changing attitudes and beliefs held by a 
group of knowledgeable UK interviewees about key aspects of the IFRS project and 
identify the extent to which the problems which emerged in 2005 were foreseen by 
the interviewees at the first interviews in 2001/2 and the second interviews in 2003/4.   
 
The interviewees remained fast in their belief at both interviews that the adoption of 
IFRS in the EU was a fundamentally good thing and that little attention appeared to 
have been paid to the academic studies which emphasise the importance of specific 
country context or the problems this can cause in achieving convergence.  Concerns 
were expressed to some extent at the first interviews about the future of reporting for 
SMEs, the complexity of the accounting model, particularly relating to fair values, the 
future of reporting by SMEs, consistency of interpretation and the future of the UK 
true and fair view.  These concerns were re-iterated more strongly at the second 
interviews as the reporting date grew nearer.   
 
There was virtually no concern about US influence on the IASB standards at the first 
interviews.  Dissatisfaction had grown considerably by the time of the second 
interviews because of the IASB/FASB agreement to converge standards.  This was 
viewed with great suspicion and regarded as a back door means of introducing US 
GAAP to the EU.   
 
Interestingly, the greatest change between the two sets of interviews was the 
realisation, which did not emerge at the first interviews that the UK loss of influence 
over standard setting was a significant problem.  At the first interviews this was 
generally regarded as a price worth paying to achieve harmonisation within the EU, 
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but serious doubts had emerged by the second interviews from those who had 
previously been able of exert influence that the project was beyond their reach and 
subject to too much US influence.   
 
Issues were the subject of debate in the press in 2005 as companies converted to IFRS 
were the complexity and appropriateness of the IFRS accounting model, the lack of 
accountability of the IASB itself, the ‘Norwalk’ agreement reached between the IASB 
and the US FASB to converge IFRS with US GAAP, the status of the UK’s true and 
fair view under IFRS, and the future of financial reporting for non-listed entities.   
 
All these issues were flagged up to some extent in our interviews and concerns about 
them appears to have grown since our second round of interviews.  The issue that was 
identified the least was the accountability of the IASB.  This was partially identified 
as a loss of influence by the interviewees but the accountability issue was not fully 
grasped.   
 
The UK’s model of accounting regulation has traditionally paid attention to a ‘think 
small first’ model as all companies have to prepare GAAP compliant accounts.  This 
regulatory model has been reinforced by proportionality and targeting principles of 
the Better Regulation Task Force (2003).  The decision to adopt IFRS throughout the 
EU has turned this on its head into a ‘top down strategy’ and it would seem that the 
problems which are emerging in the UK may be partially attributable to this change, 
and attributable to the insufficient attention being paid to issues which are specific to 
the UK context and its regulatory framework.   
 
It was one of the regulator interviewees who believed that users would be ‘bewildered 
but better informed’.  This paper raises the question as to whether IFAD’s ‘new 
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algebra’ is truly achievable or whether the accountancy profession and regulators are 
‘hunting a snark’.   
 
7.  Opportunities for future research  
We suggest that similar qualitative studies could be carried out in other EU countries 
to establish whether the views of key players are the same as those in the UK, and if 
not, how they differ.  Further research is also needed on optimal regulatory and 
accountability models for standard setting and the reporting needs of SMEs in a 
standard setting environment that is primarily focussed on global capital markets.  
Research could also be carried out into how many companies are truly global and the 
extent to which users will benefit from this very costly change.  The rhetoric of the 
vision has yet to be fully tested.   
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Notes 
 
1  Throughout this paper we refer to International standards generically as IFRS, except from a 
direct quote. 
 
2  See Street (2005) for a more detailed history of the development of the IASC during the 1990s 
and the significant  influence of the FASB and the  G4 + 1 technical group, comprising 
representatives from standard setters in  Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US on  
development of policy in international standard setting. 
 
3  Endorsement is the responsibility of the European Commission who seek advice from an expert 
group - EFRAG (European Financial Reporting Advisory Group),   
 
4  The Hundred Group’s members comprise the Finance Directors of the UK top hundred listed 
companies. 
 
5  The five principles are defined as follows: proportionality – regulators should only intervene 
when necessary.  Remedies should be appropriate to the risk posed, and cost identified and 
minimised; accountability - regulators must be able to justify decisions and be subject to public 
scrutiny; consistency  - government rules and standards must be joined up and implemented 
fairly; transparency -  regulators should be open and keep regulations simple and user friendly; 
targeting -  regulation should be focussed on the problem and minimise side effects. 
 
6  Pareto criterion for social choice is a well recognised measure.  Options are considered which 
can make some agents better off without others being worse off. 
 
7  The Big Four  currently comprise: PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst and 
Young. 
 
8  So the designation (R1b) would be a reference to the second interview with regulator 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Is the introduction of common accounting standards within the EU for the group 
accounts of listed companies desirable? 
 
Inter- 
Viewee 
Response interview 1 Response interview 2 
C1 Yes – comparability in single EU market. Yes – need for comparable global standards, Europe is a 
reasonable start.  But standards moving in wrong 
direction.  Don’t see how applying IFRS will reduce cost 
of capital. 
C2 Yes in theory.  Different interpretations in practice.   Yes – but achievable in practice? 
P1 Yes – need for common language to meet needs of 
international markets.  Europe wants a European 
market in financial services –so it needs a common 
language.  Logical to pick up IFRS.  Will support 
international harmonisation, but not if we develop 
our own rules.  Danger of that receding. 
Yes- common accounting standards required for global 
markets.  Better knowledge will lead to better pricing & 
better allocation of capital.  Long term better 
understanding of all companies, so reduction of risk 
premium & rising share prices. 
P2 Yes – our clients will welcome it.  Help groups 
enforce common accounting standards internally / 
present results on a level playing field. 
Yes – no doubts. 
P3 Yes – comparability, but not personally affected. Yes – improved comparability, but painful getting there. 
P4 Yes –usual harmonisation arguments.  Less 
convinced about European focus. 
Yes – good for comparing investments. 
R1 Yes – signal to the world, raise standards in Europe, 
meet needs of capital markets.  Some Europeans 
want own standards to negotiate better with the US. 
Yes – global standards (rather than European ones) will 
improve transparency.  Some constituencies regret loss of 
control. 
R2 Not for us to comment.  Long term commitment to 
making progress on global standards. 
Not for us to comment. 
R3 Yes – should raise level of accounting / promote 
growth of European capital markets with London 
playing a key role.  Also investor protection issue.  
Foreign registrants want to be confident that 
accounting in home country is of high standard. 
Yes – comparability of information. 
R4 Yes – facilitates cross border investment.  Improved 
transparency throughout Europe. 
Yes – develop cross border investment.  Danger they may 
not be true global standards but European standards 
R5 Yes – cut consolidation costs, compare investments 
& raise standards in Europe.  The link between tax 
and accounting in many countries will prevent the 
full benefits being realized. 
N/A 
R6 N/A Yes – little disagreement on principle, just detail. 
R7 N/A Yes- lower costs/ more informed capital markets. 
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Table 2 
 
How familiar are you with IFRS? What is your view of the quality of the standards? 
 
Inter- 
Viewee 
Response interview 1 Response interview 2 
C1 I probably know more than most.  Still tendency for 
too many options, but less than previously.  
Improving- more robust and rigorous than they used 
to be.  Haven’t pinpointed all the differences yet.  
Derivatives treatment is over-complex. 
Don’t agree with fair value project.  Business is driven by 
generating cash flow & fair value balance sheet won’t 
help understand what true performance is.  Cos are not 
challenging the IASB, just focusing on implementation.  
Lack of representation from preparers, while technical 
partners always turn up.  IFRS is good enough to produce 
respectable accounts comparable with ASB’s.  Must 
capitalise development costs under IFRS – issue for us. 
C2 I have experience of applying IFRS within group.  
IFRS is OK.  Difficult to bring together different 
cultures.  How it is supposed to be may be different 
from how it is. 
I don’t know a lot about IFRS.  No worse than UK 
GAAP. 
P1 Probably reducing quality of standards in UK, but I 
don’t think quality of financial reporting will decline 
as most FDs realise good accounts helps you obtain 
money at a decent price.  Don’t think IFRS is 
currently more rule based than UK GAAP, but given 
US influence on IASB, we may end up with more 
rules.  At least they have a standard on financial 
instruments, but it’s crap.  FRS 5 is a good standard 
but not exportable – it’s on the very principles end 
of the rules v.  principles spectrum. 
Promote transparency – which is new in many European 
countries.  IASB is too theoretical at times.  Sometimes 
produces dumb answers to dumb questions due to rushed 
processes  
P2 I don’t really know too much.  IAS seems to be 
trying to be all things to all men.  Not yet aware of 
any problem standards under IFRS.  Not convinced 
we’re going to end up with anything better.  Not 
sure of the role of the true and fair override under 
IFRS. 
I now know more, but not as much as I’m going to need 
to know for 2005.  On the whole IFRS is better than UK 
GAAP - more intellectually coherent at the cost of more 
rules and details.  European failure to endorse IAS 32 & 
39 might damage IASB, but it would do worse things to 
Europe resulting in Euro IFRS and no US recognition. 
P3 Don’t know very much about differences with UK 
GAAP.  Thought recent UK standards were more in 
line with international thinking. 
I probably know more than anyone else in the office, but 
not a huge amount.  Don’t really know about differences 
except deferred tax. 
P4 Knew little about it & not competent to discuss. British companies will not gain in the truth & fairness of 
balance sheets, although presentation will be same as its 
competitors.  Off balance sheet finance may be an issue. 
R1 I probably know more than anyone else you have 
interviewed.  They are not as good as UK standards, 
but with some improvements they could be alright.  
Some IFRSs don’t have the depth of guidance of 
later FRSs.  Less good on business combinations 
and accounting for substance of transactions.  IAS 
39 is appalling.  Insurance is a problem for 
everyone. 
I know a little! On the whole reasonable standards – don’t 
like progress on business combinations project (American 
solution).  IAS 32 & 39 should be adopted asap.  Would 
like to see substance over form built into the standards. 
R2 Have the convergence handbook so I know as much 
as I would choose to know.  IFRS – some standards 
need improvement.  Where we end up may be very 
different from what we’ve got now. 
There is enough difference in just two standards; we will 
focus on material accounting treatments and disclosure 
items. 
R3 I’ve spent the last 4 years looking at them.  It is easy 
to misunderstand IFRS if you read them from an old 
fashioned UK perspective, e.g.  prudence is no 
longer a fundamental accounting concept.  Good on 
revenue recognition – bad on accounting for 
substance of transactions.  IAS 39 is 
incomprehensible. 
Don’t think we’ve moved to a better regulatory 
framework – less history.  Don’t like changes driven by 
US convergence.  ED4 & draft insurance standard are 
awful.  Questionable how well they can be applied by any 
but the largest companies.  Concerned that they focus on 
technically pure answer ignoring cost implications. 
R4 I know a little bit ! IFRS is very good and getting 
better.  Principles have been refined, more 
prescriptive but with greater consistency.  IFRS 
deals with unforeseen circumstances which produces 
complexity.  Some standards need reduced options. 
Will produce more volatility. 
Impairment will cause problems.  Some people will not 
recognise impairment until it stares them in the face.  
There is going to be some ‘cherry picking’. 
R5 Not an expert.  IFRS still needs improving / 
reducing options.  Concern about treatment of off 
balance sheet finance, pensions and deferred tax.  At 
least they’ve got something on financial instruments.
N/A 
R6 N/A US influence comes through in anti-avoidance philosophy 
– produces more detailed rules.  IASB seem to be lifting 
some standards from US GAAP.  Does not help their 
perception in Europe.  Post 2005 there will be gains and 
losses, perhaps a slight improvement.  Audit firms may 
clear up old messes.  Financial instruments standard for 
the first time, also share options.  Loss – FRS 5, SORPS 
R7 N/A No great knowledge. 
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Table 3 
 
The introduction of IFRS will mean a loss of influence by UK regulators, preparers, 
auditors and users over the rules that govern financial reporting.  Is this a worthwhile 
cost? 
 
Inter- 
Viewee 
Response interview 1 Response interview 2 
C1 No views on sovereignty of accounting standards.  
It’s a worthwhile cost.  UK does not rule the 
world, we work in a global environment. 
Still some influence via Tweedie.  Annoyed about local 
standard setters defending own patch.  Little influence on 
setting / directing agenda of IASB – fairly independent 
organisation. 
C2 Don’t see it as a problem.  We can’t maintain 
different standards for ourselves. 
Not bothered about loss of influence.  Just a variation on 
accounting principles – learn to live with. 
P1 Tweedie keen to operate IASB as a partnership – 
need to relate to culture or you invent the 
Esperanto of the accounting world. 
I think UK has high quality financial reporting and 
something would be lost as a consequence.  They work for 
the UK market, not sure whether IFRS will work as well for 
the UK market.  So we are losing influence and a degree of 
quality but I think the long term goal is worth pursuing. 
P2 No concern.  Important that annual reporting is 
easily comparable – better product if it is. 
Companies don’t care – just want one set of clear rules 
which apply internationally. 
P3 Still some input.  Price worth paying in the global 
economy. 
Loss of influence is not an issue to clients or us. 
P4 Inevitable but price worth paying. No – small firms had no influence in the UK context. 
R1 If we have the right views, those views should 
prevail.  We shouldn’t accept to lose too often. 
US is starting to question its own rules, we 
shouldn’t just converge to US. 
We’re having to wait for other countries to catch up.  Its 
important for everybody to feedback direct to IASB on 
consultation drafts, then will not lose.  ASB should provoke 
debate.  British need to be active in international forums.   
Now seeing a lingering attachment in Europe to control over 
standard setting. 
R2 Yes but ASB is strong & influential and will 
punch above its weight’.  Ultimately we will have 
more influence in a global environment. 
I don’t think so.  We have our say. 
R3 Rest of the world thinks we have too much 
influence over the IASB. 
We’ve lost influence, but will gain globally applied 
accounting standards promoting easier movement of capital 
& greater influence for the EU.  Don’t think ASB is leading 
IASB projects anymore. 
R4 Worth giving up.  IAS will have greater 
confidence and understanding round the world 
than UK standards ever could. 
Trend of alignment with IASB already existed in UK.  
Others resent the influence ‘Anglos’ have over their laws.  
EU is IASB’s biggest customer but it negotiates its agenda 
with FASB . 
R5 Accepted loss of influence, but still the 
endorsement mechanism. 
N/A 
R6 N/A Many groups will feel they have little influence over the 
ASB now.  ASB has special partnership arrangements, but 
now a bit part player, although still the most influential in 
Europe.  It’s the standards that count.  A strong consultation 
process helps people accept the end result. 
R7 N/A Plusses exceed the minuses.  Would be a loss if national 
standard setters disappeared.  For the foreseeable future we 
will have to have national standards that reflect international 
ones.  Need to keep expertise to develop good quality 
standards.   
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Table 4 
 
What is the future form of financial reporting for those entities in the UK not covered 
by the Regulation? Future of UK GAAP and ASB?  
 
Inter- 
Viewee 
Response interview 1 Response interview 2 
C1 Will use IFRS for subsidiaries if permitted.  Lots 
of detailed adjustments is inefficient & errors are 
more likely. 
No role for ASB- just interpreting IAS and making changes 
for unlisteds.  No long term future. 
C2 Smaller cos need simplified accounts – whatever 
needed by IR.  Many users don’t seem to 
understand accounts – prefer discussion. 
Not aware of arrangements for unlisted cos.  ASB needed to 
influence IASB. 
P1 DTI should allow anyone who wants to, to adopt 
IFRS – which should become norm for all cos.  
Need to consult on SMEs.  No advice to clients 
until DTI pronounces.  Danger ASB becomes less 
effective because preparers are less willing to be 
involved if somebody else makes decisions. 
We don’t want 3 sets of standards.  By 2010 UK standards 
will have become IFRS, except small GAAP.  The divide is 
not listed v.  non listed. 
ASB – transitional role only. 
P2 There is a case for moving to IFRS even among 
unlisted cos.  Few businesses are solely UK 
concerns, but maybe costs exceed benefits. 
Less & less people will know UK GAAP as time passes.  
No role for ASB once new regime established.    
We’re advising clients on a case by case basis. 
P3 Need to ensure no barriers to listing.  Accounts 
should be based on same principles regardless of 
size.  Current FRSSE doesn’t save work, just 
press a different button on computer.  
Harmonisation is fairly irrelevant to our clients. 
UK GAAP must have limited lifespan.  Clients will look to 
us for guidance, probably stick with UK GAAP.   
Helpful if we could simplify matters – clients like to 
disclose minimum, so FRSSE helps. 
P4 Unlisteds need a longer period of transition, even 
if UK GAAP converges with IFRS.  Not keen on 
extending scope of FRSSE.  Even now our 
checklists and disclosures for small cos are based 
on full GAAP rather than FRSSE as it minimises 
firms’ exposure to risk. 
International standards now to be trickled down to local 
accounting standards but medium sized cos now very few in 
number.  No proposals for international FRSSE yet. 
No need for ASB if not issuing standards. 
Will use UK FRSSE for most clients- advise them to sit 
tight. 
R1 No need for harmonisation of small companies, 
but in UK accustomed to one model of financial 
reporting.  Also don’t want barriers between 
listed & unlisted companies.  Subsidiaries of 
international companies will want IAS for cost 
benefit reasons.   
Existence of UK GAAP provides a let out – a 
very occasional override.  Without ASB, UK 
would have less influence globally or within 
Europe.  Favour expanding use of FRSSE – same 
principles, fewer disclosures.   
We don’t want 2 sets of standards by 2010.  UK GAAP will 
fade away as a result of convergence.  Perhaps higher 
threshold for an international FRSSE, 
ASB needs to provoke debate, also special position with 
IASB reflects the importance of our capital markets. 
R2 Not sure how having 2 systems will further the 
quality of financial reporting.  Hopefully by 2005 
little difference between standards.  Need for 
urgent decision on unlisteds 
Have to live with 2 sets of standards in the short term . 
R3 I don’t think unlisteds will change unless they 
have time on their hands.  Would like an 
international FRSSE for SMEs.. 
Beyond requirements of EU Regulation, happy to leave it to 
the market.  Still issue of SMEs – the usual argument is to 
reduce disclosure, but maintain measurement principles 
which are getting more complex. 
Cos will move over if there is a tax advantage. 
Doubt that the cost of maintaining UK GAAP will be 
worthwhile, but we’ll still need a strong UK think tank 
underpinning our approach to IFRS, probably institutes.   
R4 Difficult – IASB talking about a FRSSE, but not 
on the immediate agenda.  Can’t see the grounds 
for having multiple standards in different 
countries.  Small companies become large ones. 
SMEs are a very different project but I would still like 
something similar to IFRS. 
 
R5 We don’t know what to do about unlisteds so we 
are consulting.  Everything will converge 
anyway, with ASB re-badging IASB standards.  
Unresolved issues like international FRSSE, 
relationship of SORPS to IFRS.  We’re pushing 
for an international FRSSE.   
N/A 
R6 N/A Don’t see UK standards for smaller cos disappearing soon, 
but unattractive to run parallel regimes for ever. 
Very keen for IASB to develop a standard for SMEs, but 
some opposition.  Would cut disclosure primarily, but may 
not save much time/ money. 
R7 N/A As UK standards converge with IFRS, UK GAAP 
irrelevant.  Need to sort out small co acs.  Plans exist for 
international FRSSE. 
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Table 5 
 
To what extent is it likely that there will be consistent application of IFRS across the 
EU from 2005? 
 
 Inter- 
Viewee 
Response interview 1 Response interview 2 
C1 Many countries in EU ignore rules set in Brussels 
while we apply them creating a competitive 
disadvantage. 
At present sets of IAS accounts produced in different 
countries in Europe are completely different.  That will 
change. 
C2 Standard setters are remote from practice.  From 
my experience- - our auditors changed subsidiary 
accounts prepared in IAS approved by another 
auditor from the same firm in another country – 
different interpretation of IAS.  Some are political 
and the truth is hidden on purpose with auditors’ 
knowledge. 
Will not be applied consistently.  We just accepted audited 
accounts from other countries. 
P1 Firms can have a major role.  We are developing 
structures to harmonise our global structures. 
Most member states will be singing from same 
hymn sheet by 2010.  Probably by 2007 in the 
UK, France and Germany but it will be a 
continuing process.  We realise the benefit in 
looking in the same direction. 
Will be differences in interpretation of IFRS relating to past 
experience & practice in each country.  After a few years it 
will become apparent that some countries do some things 
differently – it will come into line.  May need some 
interpretation from IFRIC.  The learning process may 
adversely affect confidence e.g.  from analysts. 
National regulators may have to get used to being told they 
are wrong by IFRIC.  The practicalities will mean local 
decisions must be made. 
P2 Not concerned for subsidiaries of major listed 
companies with group prescribed policies, culture 
,procedures and methods.  Bigger risk in 
nationally based companies. 
Depends on education and training.  We have a co-ordinated 
approach via global firm committee.   
P3 Bound to be transitional problems – different 
approaches to disclosure.  Confusion.  Whole 
industry of finding ways around some of the 
issues.   
Not sure.  We’ll do our best to comply.  Germans are more 
used to applying rules and are probably ahead of us. 
Never heard of IFRIC but would appear to have an important 
role in making accounts comparable. 
P4 Would depend on quality of enforcement. As for any major change different interpretations due to 
doubt / dislike results.  Will take time to correct.  IFRIC will 
be swamped.  May not be too much of a problem if UK 
France and Germany get up to speed relatively soon given 
they account for most listed companies.   
R1 Concern that if there is an area where IAS is less 
clear than UK GAAP the loophole will be 
exploited.  Will then need to plug the loophole.  
Need to educate the firms 
Probably not a common interpretation in 2005, but we’ll 
have a go.  Audit firms have a huge responsibility to 
minimize those differences – but real challenge.  Hopefully 
enough interchange with others around the world to ensure 
euro-IFRS does not develop.  Also SEC enforcement for 
foreign registrants likely to impact on IFRS.   
R2 Danger companies would register in countries 
where they can interpret IFRS in the way they 
want. 
Some countries, particularly those not used to principle 
based standards looking for further guidance beyond the 
standards and IFRIC interpretations.  IFRIC would not be 
able to deal with all of them – will tell them to look at the 
principles for the answer.  Some securities regulators fancy 
having a go at interpretation.   
R3 Need a mechanism where we sit down and decide 
how to interpret the standard and gain 
convergence. 
Very difficult to achieve as many in Europe not accustomed 
to principle based standards, but rules.  They will want to 
turn standards into rules, but standards allow some 
flexibility.  Europeans will expect a lot from IFRIC.  IFRS 
never used on this scale before. 
R4 IFRIC should prevent widespread differences.  
Need to avoid Euro – interpretations. 
Many areas open to different interpretations.  In some 
countries (e.g.  France) it is possible to get pre-clearance 
from a stock exchange regulator – involves interpretation.  
Committee of European Securities Regulators recognises 
issues to be dealt with. 
R5 True and fair requirement in IAS 1 will apply to 
all countries – may not interpret the same way. 
Concern that implementation guidance could 
result in Euro – IFRS.  Big firms role important.   
N/A 
R6 N/A Unrealistic/ overoptimistic to think it is going to be the same.  
25 jurisdictions & 25 starting points.   
Work going on to ensure that states do not institutionalise 
any differences.  Global firms have big role to play in 
creating centres of excellence.  Keen to protect brand & 
liability position. 
R7 N/A Eventually. 
 
